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We study whether segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin (e.g., just affecting 
fixed-term employees) can achieve similar volatility than fully deregulated labor markets. 
Flexibility at the margin produces a gap in separation costs among matched workers that 
cause fixed-term employment to be the main workforce adjustment device, which in turn 
increases de labor market volatility. This increased volatility is partially reverted when 
limitations in the duration and number of renewals of fixed-term contracts are introduced. 
Under this scenario, firms respond by reducing the intensity of job destruction since it 
becomes more difficult to avoid firing costs in permanents contracts. We present a matching 
model with temporary and permanent jobs where (i) the gap in firing costs and (ii) restrictions 
in the use of fixed-term contracts helps explain the similar volatility observed in many 
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This paper is concerned with the ﬁrms’ workforce adjustment mechanisms in response to
productivity shocks. We ask whether ﬂexibility at the margin is a suﬃcient device, in
regulated markets, to achieve the quick adjustments and large volatilities that characterize
ﬂexible labor markets such as the Anglo-Saxon ones. This is an important matter because
it may help explain why some of these regulated labor markets, such as the Spanish one,
display a similar volatility than the Anglo-Saxon ones. The analysis of labor markets with
diﬀerent degrees of ﬂexibility at the margin may yield important lessons for economies
currently involved in labor market institutional reforms.
The inﬂuence of institutions on the performance of the labor market is receiving utmost
attention in recent years. Within this context, the study of the impact of ﬁring taxes on
business cycle ﬂuctuations is in its initial steps, and only recently a number of studies
have started to deal with this issue. Veracierto (2007), for example, develops a Real
Business Cycle model with establishment level dynamics and shows that ﬁring costs are
important in reducing business cycle ﬂuctuations. They preclude employment adjustments
and lower the response of the economy to aggregate productivity changes. Thomas (2006)
reaches the same conclusion using a matching model and considering economies with
diﬀerent ﬁring costs. Zanetti (2007), also within the matching framework with nominal
rigidities in the goods market., studies the impact of unemployment beneﬁts and ﬁring
t a x e so nb u s i n e s sc y c l eﬂuctuations. The latter are found to reduce the volatility of
output, unemployment, employment, and the job creation and job destruction ﬂows.
To motivate their papers, Veracierto (2007) and Thomas (2006) resort to empirical
evidence, for years 1970-1990 and 15 OECD countries, which shows a negative relation-
ship of both output and employment volatility with respect to an OECD Employment
Protection Legislation index (EPL). This relationship is reproduced in Figure 1a,1 below,
but in terms of the unemployment volatility and the OECD index of EPL on perma-
nent contracts (for the late 1980s). Overall it yields the same picture, and a negative
correlation coeﬃcient that amounts to -0.28.
Since the 1990s, however, two phenomena aﬀected the relationship between the un-
employment volatilities and the EPL legislation. The ﬁrst one is the fall in the business
cycle volatility in the US and generally in the Anglo-Saxon countries, which has come to
be known as the "Great Moderation". The second one is the growing use of temporary
contracts, as a consequence of several waves of labor market reforms introduced in many
OECD countries. These reforms have aﬀected the relative strictness of EPL on ﬁxed-term
and permanent contracts (see Table 2.A2.6, in OECD, 2004). Firms have had to adapt
their hiring and ﬁring policies and, today, produce diﬀerent responses to business cycle
1See notes of Table 1, below, for deﬁnitions and sources of these variables.
2shocks.
The extent to which ﬁrms rely on the use of ﬁxed-term contracts to adjust their work-
force has become an important matter of interest. In parallel with the growing use of
temporary work, the negative correlation of the labor market volatility with the strictness
of EPL has reversed, and we face a new scenario with a positive relationship between
unemployment volatility and EPL. This relationship, depicted in Figure 1b, yields a cor-
relation coeﬃcient of 0.55, which is signiﬁcant at a 3% critical value.2 Observe that in
the Anglo-Saxon countries there is a fall in volatility (see US, UK, Australia or Canada),
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Figure 1. Unemployment volatility vs. EPL
How have ﬁrms reacted to the changing institutional setting? Have they adapted
their workforce management strategy? Our hypothesis is that, following the possibility of
hiring on a ﬁxed-term basis, ﬁrms are using ﬂexibility at the margin as the main workforce
adjustment device. According to this, job creation and job destruction would be mainly
concentrated on the segment of temporary employment, and this would help to explain
the high labour market volatilities achieved by countries with strict EPL on permanent
contracts and a high (or growing) share of ﬁxed-term employment.
This hypothesis is somewhat endorsed by the OECD (2004), where it is shown that
countries having undertaken EPL reforms (and thus eased the relative strictness of EPL
2Quarterly data on the standardized unemployment rate for Finland is only available since 1988. For
comparability with respect to Figure 1a, Finland is not included in Figure 1b (its inclusion, in any case,
does not change the correlation coeﬃcient; it only increases its signiﬁcance).
3for ﬁxed-term contracts relative to the one on permanent contracts) have had a more
intensive use of temporary work. Along these lines, Table 1 oﬀers crucial information
to allow the diﬀerentiation of two labor market types that characterize many OECD
economies. First, the well-known Anglo-Saxon type, which is characterized by a small
degree of EPL in regular contracts, and no limitations on the renewal and duration of
temporary contracts -which we denote by [NL]-. As a consequence of the high ﬂexibility
in the regular segment of the market, there is a small use of temporary contracts like in
Australia (5.8%), Ireland (6.8%), UK (6.3%) and US (4.5%).




on TCs on PCs Share rate s.d. (u)
[A][ B][ C][ D][ E]
Australia [NL] 1.5 5.8 n.a. 6.9
Belgium [L] 1.7 7.3 42.7 8.1
Canada [NL] 1.3 12.3 n.a 5.9
Denmark [L] 1.5 10.4 45.4 8.9
Finland [L] 2.3 17.3 38.5 10.9
France [L] 2.3 12.7 20.8 4.8
Germany [L] 2.7 11.8 40.6 10.5
Ireland [NL] 1.6 6.8 47.0 8.0
Italy [L] 1.8 8.9 41.3 3.9
Japan [NL] 2.4 11.6 n.a 5.2
Netherlands [L] 3.1 12.5 49.1 12.9
Portugal [L] 4.3 16.1 39.0 12.0
Spain [L] 2.6 32.9 23.1 7.2
Sweden [L] 2.9 14.6 n.a 12.9
UK [NL] 0.9 6.3 56.1 5.3
US [NL] 0.2 4.5 n.a 8.5
Average [L] countries 2.4 14.4 37.8 9.2
Average [NL] countries 1.3 7.9 51.6 6.6
[A] Refers to limited renewals and a maximum duration of temporary contracts
(TCs): OECD, (2004); [NL] stands for No Limitations, [L] for Limitations;
[B] EPL index on permanent contracts (PCs) in the late 1990s: OECD (2004);
[C] Share of TCs in 1991-2006: Eurostat (2007); except Australia (1997),
Canada and Japan (1997-2004), and US (1995-2001): OECD (2006);
[D] Conversion rate from TCs to PCs in 1996-1997: OECD (2002).
[E] Standard deviation of the cyclical component of standardized
unemployment in 1991:1 - 2006:4: OECD Main Economic Indicators (2007).
4Second, the ﬂexibility-at-the-margin type, which combine a high degree of employ-
ment protection in the regular segment with a limited ﬂexibility in the use of temporary
contracts -which we denote by [L] in Table 1-. Economies such as Portugal, Sweden and
Spain are among the ones with the highest values of the EPL index (4.3, 2.9 and 2.6,
respectively) and display the highest temporary shares (16.1%, 14.6% and 32.9%).
It is well known that ﬁxed-term employment contracts have been introduced in a
number of European countries as a way to provide ﬂexibility to economies with high
employment protection levels. Nevertheless, the implementation of temporary contracts
have typically included restrictions such as limited renewals or maximum durations.3 For
example, the Spanish 1984 labour market reform crucially broadened the scope of ﬁxed-
term contracts while, at the same time, restricted to 3 the maximum number of successive
contracts with a top accumulated duration of 2 years (OECD, 2004). In Portugal, tem-
porary contracts can also be renewed 3 times, but with a longer maximum duration of
30 months. These limitations provide a great source of labor turnover and, thus, of la-
bor market volatility. For example, unemployment volatilities in Portugal and Sweden
are 12.0% and 12.9%, well above those of UK and US 5.3% and 8.5%). In turn, the
unemployment volatility in Spain (7.2%) falls between these two deregulated countries.
In other words, the ﬂexibility at the margin may be important in the achievement of the
quick adjustments and high volatilities that characterize the Anglo-Saxon labor markets.
To further check to what extent this is a promising hypothesis, Table 1 also provides the
averages by countries with and without restrictions on temporary contracts. Observe that
the ﬁrst group has a substantially higher index of EPL (2.4 versus 1.3) and a higher share
of temporary contracts (14.4% versus 7.9%), while it achieves a larger unemployment
volatility (9.2 versus 6.6). Thus, despite the Anglo-Saxon labor markets have a less
stringent legislation, unemployment in segmented/dual labor markets with restrictive EPL
and high ﬁring costs in the regular side is, on average, 33% more volatile.
One remarkable common feature of Veracierto (2007), Thomas (2006), and Zanetti
(2007) is that none of them distinguish permanent from temporary work. In these studies,
therefore, there is no space for considering the inﬂuence of ﬂexibility at the margin in
business cycle ﬂuctuations. This consideration, important in the assessment of the ﬁring
costs’ impact on these ﬂuctuations, is among the contributions of this paper.
To evaluate the business cycle implications associated with the presence of tempo-
rary employment we extend the equilibrium matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) by introducing the possibility that ﬁrms hire workers on a ﬁxed-term basis. We,
thus, diﬀerentiate between permanent and temporary employees, where the latter have
ﬁxed-term contracts and virtually zero ﬁring costs. Fixed-term contracts have a limited
duration by deﬁnition and many countries have introduced legal restrictions on their use
3For a comprehensie overview of such restrictions see OECD (2004).
5in the form of a maximum number of renewals. When this maximum is reached, ﬁrms are
bounded to convert them into permanent contracts, with higher ﬁring costs, and change
the status of the worker. To avoid this restriction, however, ﬁrms have the alternative
to ﬁnish that temporary relationship and hire a new temporary worker. Our theoretical
model features these restrictions. Since many OECD countries show a high degree of
employment protection in regular jobs and limited ﬂexibility in the use of temporary ones
( s e eT a b l e1 )w eﬁnd this model particularly suitable to study the incidence of ﬂexibility
at the margin on labor market volatility.
Our formal analysis draws on a widely accepted distinction between entrants (or out-
siders) and insiders (see Lindbeck and Snower, 1989), which is not new either in the
matching literature (see for example Wasmer, 1999; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Kugler
et al., 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Osuna, 2005). However, in contrast with
the long-run perspective generally taken by previous studies, this paper diﬀers in scope
and focuses exclusively on business cycle ﬂuctuations. Our paper also diﬀers from Boeri
and Garibaldi (2007), who focus on the transitional dynamics of EPL reforms providing
ﬂexibility ‘at the margin’.
In particular, this paper contributes to the understanding of the sources of unemploy-
ment volatility by assessing the role played by (i) the gap between the separation costs
of the ﬁxed-term and permanent employees; and (ii) restrictions in the use of temporary
contracts. We claim that these are two important driving forces behind the volatility
achieved by segmented labor markets.4 The simulated results provide new insights on the
eﬀects of diﬀerent EPL schemes on the cyclical behavior of job ﬁnding and job destruction
probabilities and unemployment. We consider these eﬀects in three scenarios, one of full
regulation (strict EPL), one of no regulation (loose EPL), and a third one with regulation
in the regular segment (permanent contracts) and ﬂexibility at the margin. The main
results stem from considering a situation with ﬂexibility at the margin in which, we show,
the gaps in separation costs between temporary and permanent jobs and the restricted
use of ﬁxed-term contracts increase the labor market volatility with respect to a situation
of strict EPL with no gap in ﬁring costs. It should be noted that, within each scenario,
we ﬁnd the standard result that a rise in ﬁring costs reduces the volatility of the labor
market (Thomas, 2006, Veracierto, 2007 and Zanetti, 2007).
The main intuition behind the higher volatility observed in the scenario with ﬂexi-
bility at the margin with respect to a fully regulated labor market is simple. To avoid
transitions to a permanent status, which entails future costs in case of adjustments, ﬁrms’
workforce adjustments take place more intensively and with higher frequency in tempo-
rary jobs. In particular, rather than converting ﬁxed-term contracts into permanent, ﬁrms
4Azariadis and Pissarides (2007) have recently argued that unemployment volatility is magniﬁed by
international capital mobility. Our claim is that it is also increased by the legislative setup.
6will tend to ﬁre ‘old’ temporary workers and hire new ones not yet aﬀected by the legal
conversion restriction. This situation generates large volatilities in the job ﬁnding and
job destruction probabilities associated with temporary contracts, as well as in unemploy-
ment. However, in the presence of limitations in the duration and number of renewals
of ﬁxed-term contracts, these lager volatilities are somewhat reduced. Adjustments on
temporary workers become constricted, it is thus more diﬃcult to avoid the ﬁring costs
on permanent contracts, and ﬁrms respond by reducing the intensity of job destruction.
Summing up, a higher conversion probability of ﬁxed-term contracts into permanent ones
reduces the volatility of the labor market.
When ﬂexibility at the margin is suppressed, most of the volatility in our model
vanishes and gives rise to a scenario similar to the one before the explosion of ﬁxed-term
employment in many OECD countries. This situation corresponds to the one in the
aftermath of the labor market reforms that took place since the 1990s in many of these
economies. In short, we show that the scenario of ﬂexibility at the margin provides an
intermediate situation, in terms of volatility, with respect to the fully regulated and fully
deregulated labor markets. This paper, therefore, provides an evaluation of some of the
pros and cons of this type of reforms and gives some policy insights for those countries
currently seeking to foster the ﬂexibility of their labor markets.
A ﬁnal important result is the countercyclical behavior we ﬁnd between job destruc-
tion and the business cycle both in fully deregulated and ﬂexibility-at-the-margin labor
market types. This result clariﬁes a similar empirical ﬁnding for Spain in Messina and
Valanti (2007) and helps to explain why the job turnover rate of some regulated labor
markets displays a countercyclical behavior in contrast to the acyclical or even procyclical
movements suggested by some studies (Garibaldi, 1998).
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
which is calibrated in Section 3 and simulated in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is integrated by a continuum of risk-neutral, inﬁnitely-lived workers and
ﬁrms, which discount future payoﬀs at a common rate β. We further assume that capital
markets are perfect.
Workers can either be employed or unemployed. Those who are employed can be so
either on a temporary basis (T),o ro nap e r m a n e n to n e(P).W h e nﬁnding a job, unem-
ployed workers become temporary and only from there may be upgraded to permanent
with probability ι. The productivity of the match is a function of aggregate productiv-
ity At,a n dat e r mzt idiosyncratic to the match. There is a ﬁrm-speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t y
term independent and identically distributed across ﬁrms and time, with a cumulative
7distribution function G(z) and support [0, ¯ z].
There is a time-consuming and costly process of matching workers and job vacancies,
captured by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function m(ut,v t),w h e r eut denotes the
unemployment rate and vt is the vacancy rate. Unemployed workers meet jobs with prob-
ability f(θt) whereas vacancies meet workers with probability q(θt). From the properties
of the matching function, these probabilities only depend on the vacancy-unemployment
ratio θt, where the higher the number of vacancies with respect to the number of unem-
ployed workers, the easier to ﬁnd a job and the more diﬃcult to ﬁll up vacancies.
Firms have a constant-returns-to-scale production technology with labor as an only
input. A posted job can either be ﬁlled or vacant. The ﬁrm has to open a job vacancy
entailing cost c per period before a position can be ﬁlled. When the vacancy is ﬁlled
the ﬁrm incurs in training costs ξ. Each productive match yields an instantaneous proﬁt
equal to the diﬀerence between labor productivity and the wage, which is Atzt − wT
t (zt)
for a temporary position and Atzt − wP
t (zt) for a permanent one.
When a match with a temporary job is terminated, the ﬁrm pays a ﬁring tax γT,
which is assumed to be fully wasted and lower or equal than the ﬁring tax for a perma-
nent position, γP. Due to legal restrictions, after renewing a number of times a ﬁxed-term
contract, ﬁrms are bounded to convert it into permanent. We abstract from the actual
restrictions on the duration of temporary jobs and the number of renewals and, for sim-
plicity, represent them by an exogenous conversion probability ι. For instance, the tighter
those restrictions are (i.e., shorter permitted maximum duration and/or fewer possible
renewals), the higher ι is. To avoid these restrictions, however, ﬁr m sh a v et h ea l t e r n a t i v e
to ﬁnish that temporary relationship and hire a new worker. If a match is broken, either
from a temporary or a permanent status, the ﬁrm opens a new vacancy.
Accordingly, the value of vacancies (Vt) and ﬁlled positions, JT
t (zt) and JP
t (zt),a r e
represented by the following Bellman equations:
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where e zj, j = I,T,C,P, are productivity thresholds deﬁned such that nonproﬁtable
8matches (i.e., with negative surplus) are severed.5 Thus, the conditions deﬁning these
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P =0 . (7)
Condition (4) refers to those unemployed workers who have met a vacant job. Note
that in this case the ﬁrm does not have to pay γT in the absence of agreement. Expres-
sions (5) and (7) deﬁne the reservation productivity for current temporary and permanent
workers, respectively, whereas (6) refers to those temporary workers on the verge of be-
coming permanent. That is, those who were drawn with probability ι.R e c a l lt h a tﬁrms
have the option to avoid temporary-to-permanent conversion by laying oﬀ workers before
they must be oﬀered a permanent contract due to legal restrictions. Hence, we need to
consider the case where a ﬁrm does not want to oﬀer a permanent contract to a temporary
worker that has been randomly chosen to become permanent. Notice that in this case the
ﬁrm is only liable to γT if it chooses to break up the match.
Let φ be an exogenous separation probability. It follows that the temporary and per-
manent matches separate with probabilities sT
t = φ+(1−φ)
£






t = φ +( 1− φ)G(e zP
t ), respectively. Moreover, job creation takes place with probability
q(θt)(1 − G(e zI
t)) when a ﬁrm and a worker meet and agree on an employment contract.
Similarly, unemployed workers ﬁnd a job with probability f(θt)(1 − G(e zI
t)).
A tt h ew o r k e r s ’s i d et h ev a l u e so ft h ed i ﬀerent statuses - unemployed, Ut;t e m p o -
rary employee, WT
t (zt);a n dp e r m a n e n te m p l o y e e ,WP
t (zt) - are given by the following
expressions:





































































5Since the value of a match is increasing in zt, we can prove that there exists a threshold e zt ∈ [0, ¯ z]
below which matches are no longer proﬁtable.
9According to these equations, any unemployed worker gets a constant current value
b = h+ψ from leisure, h, and unemployment beneﬁts, ψ. This worker becomes employed
in a temporary job if a match takes place, and remains unemployed if not. Employed
workers earn an endogenous wage wT
t (zt) if temporary and wP
t (zt) if permanent. If a
match is broken either from a temporary or a permanent status, the worker becomes
unemployed.
We also assume that there is free entry for ﬁrms. Hence ﬁrms open vacancies until the
expected value of doing so becomes zero. Therefore, in equilibrium:
Vt =0 . (11)
Furthermore, because neither workers nor employers can instantaneously ﬁnd an al-
ternative match partner in the labor market, and because hiring and ﬁring decisions are
costly, a match surplus exists. To divide this surplus we assume wages to be the result
of bilateral Nash bargaining between workers and ﬁrms. They are revised every period
upon the occurrence of new shocks, and the Nash solution is the wage that maximizes
the weighted product of the workers’ and the ﬁrms’ net return from the job match. The
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t (zt) − Ut)=η(J
P
t (zt) − Vt + γ
P), (13)
where η ∈ (0,1) denotes the workers’ bargaining power relative to ﬁrms. Note that the
Nash conditions present terms depending on γT and γP. Because separation costs are
operational they are explicitly considered in the wage negotiation. This implies that the
ﬁrms’ threat point when negotiating with a worker is no longer the value of a vacancy Vt
but (Vt − γT)o r( Vt − γP) depending on the type of worker.
To fully characterize the dynamics of the model economy, we need to deﬁne the law of
motion for the unemployment rate ut, and the mass of temporary and permanent workers,
nT
t and nP
t , respectively. These evolve according to the following diﬀerence equations:







































10Finally, we deﬁne job destruction rate (jdt) equals to the average separation rate,








3C a l i b r a t i o n
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency in order to match some empirical facts
and steady-state values for the US economy between 1953 and 2003. Following Blanchard
and Diamond (1990) we set an average unemployment rate of 11% as well as its observed
standard deviation of 12.3%. This ﬁgure is consistent with the fraction of unmatched
workers in the US when we consider not only the oﬃcially unemployed but also those
not in the labor force who are looking for a job. Following Shimer (2005) we target: (i) a
steady-state job separation probability s equal to 0.10 per quarter; and (ii) an elasticity of
the matching function with respect to unemployment of 0.72. We also target the observed
negative correlation between unemployment and labour market tightness of -0.98. Our
ﬁnal target is an elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to unemployment
beneﬁts around 1.0. As in Costain and Reiter (2007), we do not want unemployment
duration or the unemployment rate to be excessively responsive to beneﬁts. We choose
this value based on the empirical evidence found by Meyer (1990), who uses individual
data from the Continuous Wage and Beneﬁt History (CWBH) database.
We set the discount factor β =0 .99, which implies a reasonable quarterly interest rate
of nearly 1 percent in the steady state. The steady-state aggregate labor productivity A∗
is normalized to one. The logarithm of this variable follows an AR(1) process such that
logAt = ρlogAt−1 +  t. The values of the autoregressive parameter and the standard
deviation of the white noise process, ρ =0 .99 and σA =0 .013,h a v eb e e nc a l i b r a t e d
to match the cyclical volatility (1.3 percent) and persistence (0.760) of the US labor
productivity At¯ zt between 1953 and 2003.6 Following Silva and Toledo (2007), we set
training costs to be equal to the actual productivity gap of 20% between new hired
workers and incumbent employees, ξ =0 .20.
Regarding the exogenous separation probability φ, we follow den Haan et al. (2000)
by interpreting exogenous separations as worker-initiated separations. Hence, since only
endogenous separations are associated with the layoﬀ rate, ﬁrms do not incur in ﬁring
costs when separations are exogenous. This is consistent with our model since endogenous
separations are a ﬁrm’s decision. According to the evidence from the Job Opening Labor
6Where ¯ zt is the the average idiosyncratic productivity. As in Shimer (2005), the average labor
productivity is the seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the non-farm business sector,
constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the National Income and Product Accounts
and the Current Employment Statistics. It is reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with
smoothing parameter 1600.
11Turnover Survey (JOLTS) shown by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006), and from
the Census’ Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), shown by Nagypal
(2004), layoﬀs represent on average about 35% of total separations. Thus, the value for
φ is 0.065, which is close to the one used by den Haan et al. (2000). Given the total
separation rate s∗ = φ+(1−φ)G(z∗),w es o l v ef o rG(z∗)=0 .0374. To match the average
unemployment rate we set the job ﬁnding probability f(θ
∗)(1 − G(z∗)) to 0.807.T h u s ,
the job meeting rate f(θ
∗) is 0.838.
T a b l e3 .C a l i b r a t e dp a r a m e t e r sf o rt h eb a s e l i n ee c o n o m y
Parameters Value Source
Ave. aggregate labor productivity A∗ 1 Normalized
Discount rate β 0.99 [A]
Mean for the distribution of zµ −0.19 [D]
Standard deviation for the distribution of zσ 0.23 [D]
Exogenous separations φ 0.065 [D]
Persistence parameter of Aρ 0.99 [B]
Standard deviation of Aσ A 0.013 [B]
Discount rate β 0.99 [A]
Workers’ bargaining power η 0.4128 [C]
Parameter of the matching function ϕ 1.8635 [A]
Hiring costs c 0.0321 [C]
Training costs ξ 0.20 [A]
Firing costs for temporary contracts γT 0 [A]
Firing costs for permanent contracts γP 0 [A]
Employment conversion rate ι 0 [A]
Unemployment beneﬁts ψ 0.20 [A]
Leisure parameter h 0.525 [C]
Notes: [A] Other studies, data or own assumptions as explained in main text.
[B] Set to match the cyclical behavior of labor productivity.
[C] Obtained from theoretical model and to match the elasticity
of unemployment duration with respect to unemployment beneﬁts.
[D] Set to match the volatility of st and the correlation between vt and ut.








We select the matching technology parameter ϕ in order to match our target elasticity
of the matching function with respect to unemployment. Since the matching elasticity















The ﬁrst two equations arise from the properties of the matching function while the last
equation is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment in the
steady state. The solution of this system yields ϕ =1 .8635 and θ =1 .660.
Considering the value of being unemployed, b = h + ψ, we set the unemployment
beneﬁts at ψ =0 .20. This is consistent with the US ratio of beneﬁts to average wages,
which is placed at 20% at most by the OECD (1996). Vacancy costs c, workers’ bargaining
power η, and the leisure parameter h are set to ensure simultaneously that: (i) job creation
is equal to job destruction in the steady state; and, (ii) the elasticity of unemployment
duration with respect to unemployment beneﬁts is 1.0. In this way we obtain the leisure
parameter h =0 .525, c =0 .0321 and η =0 .4128.
Finally, the idiosyncratic productivity shocks are i.i.d. log-normally distributed with
mean µ = −0.19 and standard deviation σ =0 .23. These two parameters are chosen to
match the target volatility of unemployment and its observed negative correlation with
respect to labor market tightness, -0.98. Table 3 summarizes the parameter values for our
baseline economy.
For the remaining parameters associated to restrictions in the labor market, γP, γT,
and ι, we consider several cases. Our baseline parametrization describes the US labor mar-
ket, where there are hardly any legal restrictions of the type studied in our analysis. Thus,
we set γP = γT =0 . This implies the existence of just one type of job since temporary
and permanent contracts become perfect substitutes. Hence ι becomes irrelevant.7
In next section we simulate diﬀerent legislative scenarios, which we compare against
this benchmark case. The objective of this exercise is to assess the eﬀects of changes in the
EPL on the labor market volatility. The ﬁrst of these scenarios represents a situation with
employment protection and no temporary contracts. This case considers that ﬁrms provide
a single type of job. It attempts to mimic the situation of several OECD labor markets
before the introduction of the temporary contracts and the development of ﬁxed-term
employment (a paradigmatic case would be Spain before its 1984 labor market reform).
In terms of the model, this has two implications. First, ﬁrms are no longer able to
make use of ﬁxed-term contracts. As a consequence, we set γT = γP = γ, ruling out the
distinction between temporary and permanent ﬁring costs. The second implication is that
7When γP = γT, ι can take any value in [0,1]. We set it to zero. Similarly, since γP = γT =0 ,t h e r e
is only one job destruction condition. Thus, st = sT
t = sP
t = st for all t.
13the conversion probability from temporary to permanent contracts becomes irrelevant.
Another scenario presents a situation with employment protection and temporary con-
tracts, which may be subject to restrictions in terms of duration and renewal limitations.
This mimics the situation of most OECD countries in the aftermath of the partial la-
bor market reforms implemented to introduce ﬂexibility at the margin (again, the par-
adigmatic case is Spain after the 1984 labor market reform). Within this scenario, we
distinguish between two cases:
1. We set γT =0and consider diﬀerent values for γP > 0.M o r e o v e r ,w eﬁx ι =0 .10.
This value is close to the average quarterly conversion rate observed in the OECD
countries. In this context, we evaluate the eﬀects of changes in the permanent-
worker ﬁring cost on the volatility of labor market outcomes.
2. We set γT =0and γP =0 .75, so that there is a gap of 75% in ﬁring costs. As
opposed to the previous case, this exercise keeps the gap in separation costs constant.
However, here we consider a number of values for the conversion probability ι from 0
to 1. Thus, for a given gap in separation costs, we evaluate the response of the labor
market to diﬀerent degrees of restrictions on the duration and renewal of temporary
contracts.
4 Simulation results
In this Section we ﬁr s td e s c r i b et h ee ﬀects of changes in EPL on the model’s steady-state.
Then, we simulate each of the above legislative scenarios to determine the eﬀects of ﬁring
costs and the duration and renewal limitations of temporary contracts on business cycle
dynamics.
4.1 Steady state results
As noted, these scenarios stem from the values assigned to the legislative parameters:
the ﬁring tax parameters, γP and γT,a n dι, which captures the existence of renewal
restrictions in temporary contracts. When modifying these key parameters, we hold
all the other ones constant and compute the new equilibrium values of the endogenous
variables in the steady state. Table 4 shows the results from the conducted simulations
by distinguishing three analytical panels.
The ﬁrst noteworthy result if that higher values of both γ and ι reduce the relative
number of vacancies relative to unemployed (θ) and this, in turn, diminishes the workers’
hiring probability f (θ). Intuitively, this is the outcome of the ﬁrms’ internalization of
higher expected ﬁring costs, whose response hinders job creation. Note that this result is
14especially signiﬁcant in the scenario without ﬂexibility at the margin (panel 1), because
ﬁring costs become immediately operational once the match takes place. For example, in
the absence of temporary contracts (panel 1), when the ﬁring tax is increased from 0% to
75% of labor productivity, f (θ) falls by 77% (from 80.7 to 18.7). With ﬂexibility at the
margin (panel 2), this probability is reduced only by 7.7% (from 80.7 to 74.5).
Table 4. Simulated steady states under diﬀerent
scenarios of employment protection (%)
uf (θ) ss T sP nT
(1−u)
Panel 1: γT = γP = γ,ι =0
γ =0 .00 (Baseline case) 11.03 80.70 10.00 10.00 10.00 100
γ =0 .75 25.82 18.67 6.50 6.50 6.50 100
γ =1 .00 33.27 13.04 6.50 6.50 6.50 100
Panel 2: γT =0 .00,ι=0 .10
γP =0 .75 15.88 74.46 14.06 17.30 6.50 70.00
γP =1 .00 19.01 72.00 16.90 19.09 6.50 82.59
γP =2 .00 23.33 68.69 20.91 20.93 6.50 99.99
Panel 3: γT =0 .00,γP =0 .75
ι =0 .10 15.88 74.46 14.06 17.30 6.50 70.00
ι =0 .50 15.82 70.94 13.13 35.14 6.50 23.76
ι =1 .00 15.46 70.33 12.86 55.95 6.50 12.86
The second main result is the behavioral change in separations across scenarios. On
one hand, they decline when temporary employment is not allowed. On the other hand,
they rise in a labor market with ﬂexibility at the margin due to the additional separations
aﬀecting temporary jobs.
The ﬁrst response (in panel 1) is a well known result in the literature. The higher
the ﬁring costs, the more expensive becomes shedding workers. Firms, thus, tend to
reduce their job destruction rate, in this particular case from 10.0% to 6.5% when the
gap in ﬁring costs rises from 0% to 75%. This response, however, changes dramatically
when ﬁrms are allowed to have ﬂexibility at the margin (panel 2), in which case the same
rise in ﬁring costs increases the job destruction probability from 10.0% to 14.1%. To
avoid incurring in ﬁring costs, ﬁrms make use of ﬁxed-term contracts which will be more
intensive the higher the separation tax on permanent workers. Notice that this response
is entirely driven by endogenous job destruction in temporal contracts. Moreover, in case
of having to face restrictions in terms of the duration and number of renewals of ﬁxed-
term contracts (panel 3), ﬁrms will ﬁnd it optimal to further increase their temporary job
15destructions (as a way to avoid transitions to a permanent status, which entails future
costs in case of adjustments. In particular, before converting ﬁxed-term contracts, they
will hire another temporary worker and start the process again. However, given the gap
in ﬁring costs, the average separation probability is reduced with higher levels of ι due to
the observed reduction in the share of temporal workers nT/(1−u).I ns h o r t ,i nr e s p o n s e
to higher ﬁring costs, a situation of ﬂexibility at the margin with restrictions generates a
large job destruction rate in temporary jobs and, eventually, in the aggregate separation
probability, s.
Third, it is also important to note that, for suﬃciently high values of γ, ﬁrms will
choose to retain their permanent workers to avoid incurring in those high separation
costs. In this situation, new separations become exogenous to the ﬁrms’ decisions.
Finally, the outcome in terms of unemployment depends on the relative strength of the
ﬁnding and ﬁring probabilities that may pull in opposite directions (a lower job ﬁnding
probability f(θ) enhances unemployment, while a lower ﬁring probability s decreases
it). The direction and relative strength of these eﬀects varies across scenarios. Without
temporary employment (panel 1), the eﬀect of the reduced job ﬁnding probability in
response to higher γ overcomes the impact of the lower separation probability. In contrast,
with ﬂexibility at the margin (panel 2), both the lower f(θ) and the higher s enhance
unemployment, the impact of the lower job ﬁnding probability being considerably larger.
The more restricted is the use of temporary jobs (panel 3), the more this upward eﬀect is
reverted.
4.2 Business Cycle results
For each simulation we create 1000 sample paths of 1200 quarters, throw away the ﬁrst
1000 and keep the 200 quarters corresponding to 1953-2003; detrend the generated data
using the HP ﬁlter with the smoothing parameter equal to 1600; and calculate the stan-
dard deviations and correlation coeﬃcients of the relevant variables. Table 5 compares
the simulated results of our benchmark US economy with the data taken from Shimer
(2005).
As in previous Section, when modifying the key parameters (ι,γP−γT),w eh o l da l lt h e
other ones constant and compute the new equilibrium values of the endogenous variables
in the steady state. We then solve and simulate the model around the new steady state,
and compute the second moments of the relevant variables.
These exercises provide new insights on the eﬀects of diﬀerent EPL schemes, in par-
ticular of a situation with ﬂexibility at the margin, on the cyclical behavior of the job
ﬁnding probability f(θ), the separations in temporary and permanent jobs (sTand sP),
and unemployment (u). Table 6 summarizes the results from the conducted simulations,
again by distinguishing three analytical panels.
16The ﬁrst important result, in terms of Business cycle ﬂuctuations, is the increased
volatility of f(θ) in response to higher values of γP and ι. This holds within the three
scenarios considered, as shown in the second column of Table 6. In the absence of tempo-
rary contracts (panel 1), when the ﬁring tax is increased from 0% to 75%, the volatility
of f(θ) is multiplied by 2.6 (from 5.3 to 13.7). With ﬂexibility at the margin and the
possibility of ﬁxed-term contracts (panel 2), this volatility is increased by almost 74%
(from 5.3 to 9.2). This scenario, however, assumes a low conversion probability of 10%.
When the conversion probability is larger, for example 50%, then this volatility increases
by an additional 20% and reaches 11.04 (panel 3).
Table 5. Data and simulated results for the US economy, 1953-2003.
Data uvθ f (θ) sA t¯ zt
Std. deviation (%) 12.34 13.89 25.66 7.76 5.92 1.33
Autocorrelation 0.861 0.903 0.892 0.804 0.573 0.760
Correlation with θ -0.976 0.981 1.000 0.929 -0.652 0.381
Simulated results uv v / u fs A t¯ zt
Std. deviation (%) 12.35 10.07 20.89 5.28 8.36 1.30
Autocorrelation 0.856 0.395 0.721 0.777 0.721 0.738
Correlation with θ -0.944 0.915 1.000 0.786 -1.000 0.981
The main intuition behind this result is along the lines of Mortensen and Nagypal
(2007) and Silva and Toledo (2007). The presence of ﬁring costs makes ﬁrms’ surplus
more responsive to variations in the level of aggregate labor productivity. These authors
develop search and matching models with constant separation rates, so that the behavior
of the labor market is entirely driven by the job creation margin.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ej o bﬁnding rate is relatively more volatile with a larger conversion
probability implies that, the more restricted the duration of a temporary contract, the
more sensitive is the job creation process to productivity shocks. In other words, a more
stringent legislation on temporary jobs make ﬁrms perceive good times as even better
times, so that they are more prone to adjust vacancies relative to the case of a labor
market without these type of contracts.
The second main result is the reduced volatility of s in response to a more stringent
legislation (i.e., higher values of γP and ι). Again this holds within the three scenarios con-
sidered, and note that it is valid for both separation rates (on temporary and permanent
jobs). More in detail, with employment protection and no temporary contracts (panel
171), a rise in ﬁring costs from 0% to 75% eliminates the volatility of the job destruction
probability (from 8.4 to 0.0). Similarly, when ﬁrms are allowed to use ﬁxed-term contracts
(panel 2), it decreases by 38% (from 8.4 to 5.2). Further, when the conversion probability
from a temporary to a permanent contract moves from 10% to 50%, the volatility of s
has an additional fall of around 50% (panel 3).
This is a well-known result (Garibaldi, 1998; Thomas, 2007) whose essential intuition
is that the higher the ﬁring costs, the more expensive becomes shedding workers, in which
case the ﬁrms’ job destruction rate becomes less sensitive to shocks. It is also worth
remarking that, as in the case of the steady state, it is natural to expect zero volatility
of sT when γ surpasses some threshold value for which separations on permanent jobs
become exogenous.
Table 6. Simulated volatilities under diﬀerent
scenarios of employment protection (%)
σ(u) σ(f(θ)) σ(s) σ(sT) σ(sP)
Panel 1: γT = γP = γ,ι =0
γ =0 .00 (Baseline case) 12.35 5.28 8.36 8.36 8.36
γ =0 .75 6.63 13.70 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ =1 .00 5.75 15.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel 2: γT =0 .00,ι=0 .10
γP =0 .75 11.03 9.17 5.21 6.28 0.00
γP =1 .00 10.91 9.96 4.54 4.54 0.00
γP =2 .00 9.69 10.50 2.98 2.98 0.00
Panel 3: γT =0 .00,γP =0 .75
ι =0 .10 11.03 9.17 5.21 6.28 0.00
ι =0 .50 10.03 11.04 2.65 4.34 0.00
ι =1 .00 9.74 11.37 3.35 3.48 0.00
A third result concerns the response of unemployment, which depends on whether or
not the fall in the volatility of separations exceeds the increase in the volatility of the
ﬁring probability. Note that in our analysis it does; and therefore, the unemployment
volatility declines in the three scenarios considered.
Given this third benchmark result, by comparing panels 1 and 2, we can also look
at the change in unemployment volatility in response to changes in just the volatility
of the separation rate. For example, departing from a scenario with strict employment
protection (ﬁring costs at 75% of labor productivity) and no segmentation (panel 1), when
ﬁrms are allowed to use ﬁxed-term contracts not subject to ﬁring costs (panel 2), the
unemployment volatility increases by 66% (from 6.6 to 11.0). This result contributes to
the understanding of the actual rise experienced by countries that in the 1990s undertook
partial labor market reforms introducing ﬂexibility at the margin.
18Finally, it is important to remark the intermediate position, in terms of Business Cycle
volatilities, of the scenario with ﬂexibility at the margin (panel 2). A natural place, it
seems, between fully regulated and fully deregulated labor markets.
4.3 Employment protection and simulated correlations
Messina and Valanti (2007) have recently examined the impact of ﬁring restrictions on
job ﬂow dynamics. They provide evidence that ﬁrms with tight ﬁring restrictions smooth
job destruction over the business cycle so that job turnover becomes less countercyclical.
This is a result in line with previous studies that suggests an acyclical behavior of the
labor ﬂows in Continental Europe in contrast with their countercyclical pattern in the
Anglo-Saxon countries (see Garibaldi, 1998). However, Messina and Valanti also ﬁnd
some empirical evidence suggesting that the presence of temporary contracts may revert
the acyclical behavior on the job destruction rate.
This possibility is the one we explore next. In particular, we ask our model to what
extent the coexistence of EPL in permanent contracts with ﬂexibility at the margin has
a relevant incidence on the average separation rate (s) as well as on the job ﬁnding
probability f(θ). We measure this incidence with the correlation between these variables
and the business cycle.
Table 7. Simulated correlations and the business cycle
Deregulated market Regulated market Regulated market with
with no temporality restrictions in temporality
γT = γP =0 .00 γT = γP =1 .00 γT =0 .00,γ P =1 .00
ι =0 ι =0 ι =0 .1
corr(yt,f(θt)) 0.889 0.848 0.942.
corr(yt,s t) -0.981 0.000 -0.933







t are, respectively, the average idiosyncratic productivity shocks
across temporary and regular jobs. As before, we detrend the generated data
using the HP ﬁlter with the smoothing parameter is set equal to 1600.
The answer is provided in Table 7 where, again, we distinguish three stylized cases:
(i) a pure deregulated market, where γP = γT = ι =0 ; (ii) a regulated market with no
temporary contracts, where γP = γT =1 .00 and ι =0 ; and (iii) a regulated market with
restricted ﬂexibility at the margin, where γT =0 , γP =1 .00 and ι =0 .1.
It is interesting to observe that in the ﬁrst case, which we associate with the ‘Anglo-
Saxon type’ labor market, there is an almost perfect negative correlation between the job
19separation rate and the business cycle (-0.98), which is similar to that observed in the
US data (see Table 5). Further, it is also noteworthy the acyclical relationship (with a
correlation of 0.00) obtained in a regulated market with no ﬂexibility at the margin. This
is traditionally associated with some Continental European labor markets, as in Garibaldi
(1998). The value added of this exercise, however, lies in the third case, where the use of
ﬁx e d - t e r mc o n t r a c t si sr e s t r i c t e d .W ea s s o c i a t et h i sc a s ew i t ht h eﬂexibility-at-the-margin
type of labor market deﬁned in the introduction. As shown in Table 7, the large negative
correlation between the job destruction rate and the business cycle (-0.93) resembles very
much the one of the pure deregulated labor market.
5 Conclusions
This paper argues that segmented labor markets with ﬂexibility at the margin may achieve
similar volatilities than fully deregulated labor markets. This is important because most
OECD countries seem to conform to these two broadly deﬁn e dt y peo fm a r k e t s .O nt h eo n e
hand, the liberalized or Anglo-Saxon type is characterized by low levels of EPL in regular
contracts and no restrictions in the use of temporary employment. On the other hand,
what we call the ‘ﬂexibility-at-the-margin type’ features stringent EPL and limitations in
the use of temporary contracts. The ﬁrms’ response to these diﬀerent institutional setups
is in stark contrast: in the ﬁrst case, there is an occasional use of temporary contracts
whereas in the second one ﬁrms rely deeply on ﬁxed-term employment. Irrespective of
the ﬁrms’ labor management strategies, the outcome in terms of the volatility of the labor
market is similar.
We rationalize this outcome by developing a matching model with heterogenous work-
ers. In the spirit of the insider-outsider theory, we distinguish between regular and ﬁxed-
term employees and focus the analysis on a twofold dimension of segmented labor markets.
First, on the eﬀects that the gap in ﬁr i n gc o s t sa m o n gt h e s et w ot y p eo fw o r k e r sh a so n
the volatility of the labor market. Second, on the additional eﬀects that arise from re-
stricting the use of ﬁxed-term contracts in terms of their duration and maximum number
of renewals.
Our analysis conﬁrms the well-documented result that, other things equal, a rise in
separation costs reduces the volatility of the labor market. Yet, this result is extended
by considering a scenario with ﬂexibility at the margin. In this scenario, ﬁring costs
on permanent jobs, and restrictions in the use of temporary contracts change the ﬁrm’s
workforce adjustment mechanism, and yield a boost in the volatility of the labor market.
More precisely, this scenario provides an intermediate situation, in terms of labor market
volatilities, between the one of full regulation (strict EPL and no temporary contracts)
and another one of no regulation (loose EPL).
20A ﬁnal important result is the almost perfect negative correlation we ﬁnd between
job destruction and the business cycle both in the Anglo-Saxon and the ﬂexibility-at-
the-margin labor market types. This result clariﬁes the analogous ﬁnding for Spain in
Messina and Valanti (2007), that could not be conﬁrmed for the rest of the countries in
the context of their analysis. Our paper, in fact, provides the rationale for such a ﬁnding.
Let us ﬁnish by stating that the achievement of similar ﬂexibility/volatility than fully
deregulated markets without fully deregulating the labor market is not synonymous of
success. The study of the consequences of ‘ﬂexibility at the margin’ by no means implies
that this is a desirable feature. There are profound diﬀerences in these two types of
labor market whose assessment lied beyond the scope of this paper but that, nevertheless,
deserve utmost attention. Among them is the gap in productivity between temporary and
permanent workers.8 Any economic strategy relying excessively on ﬁxed-term employment
may end up biased towards low proﬁle industries, low paid jobs and, generally, have a
poor productivity performance. Spain is a paradigmatic case but this is left for future
research.
References
[1] Autor, D.H., W.R. Kerr and A.D. Kugler (2007): “Does Employment Protection Reduce
Productivity? Evidence from the US”, The Economic Journal, vol. 117 (521), pp. F189-
F217.
[2] Azariadis, C. and C.A. Pissarides (2007): “Unemployment dynamics with international
capital mobility”, European Economic Review, vol. 51, 1, pp. 27-48.
[3] Blanchard, O.J. and P. Diamond (1990): “The Cyclical Behavior of the Gross Flows of
U.S. Workers”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2, pp. 85-155.
[4] Blanchard, O.J. and A. Landier (2000): “The Perverse Eﬀects of Partial Labor Market
Reform: Fixed Term Contracts in France”, The Economic Journal, vol. 112, 480, pp.
F214-F244.
[5] Boeri, T. and P. Garibaldi (2007): “Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection: A Hon-
eymoon Eﬀect?”, The Economic Journal, vol. 117 (521), pp. F357-F385.
[6] Cahuc, P. and F. Postel-Vinay (2002): “Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor
market performance”, Labour Economics,v o l .9 ,1 ,p p .6 3 - 9 1 .
[7] Costain, J. S., and M. Reiter (2007): “Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the
Calibration of Matching Models”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,f o r t h c o m -
ing.
[8] Davis, S. J., R. J. Faberman, and J. Haltiwanger (2006): “The Flow Approach to Labor
Markets: New Data Sources and Micro-Macro Links”, Working Paper No. 12167,N a t i o n a l
Bureau of Economic Research.
8The impact of EPL on productivity has been recently studied in Autor et al. (2007) for the US. We
believe this opens a new research avenue on the interaction of these two important determinants of the
labor market performance.
21[9] Dolado, J.J., C. García-Serrano and J.F. Jimeno (2002): “Drawing lessons from the boom
of temporary jobs in Spain”, T h eE c o n o m i cJ o u r n a l , vol. 112, 480, pp. F270-F295.
[10] Garibaldi, P. (1998): “Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions”, European Economic
Review, vol. 42, pp. 245-275.
[11] den Haan, W.J., G. Ramey and J. Watson, (2000): “Job Destruction and Propagation of
Shocks”, American Economic Review, vol. 90, 3, pp. 482-498.
[12] Kugler, A., J.F. Jimeno and V. Hernanz (2002): “Employment consequences of restrictive
permanent contracts: evidence from Spanish labor market reforms”, IZA Discussion Paper
Series No. 657, IZA, Bonn.
[13] Lindbeck, A., and D.J. Snower (1989): The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and
Unemployment,M I TP r e s s .
[14] Malo, M.A. and L. Toharia (2000): “The Spanish experiment: pros and cons of ﬂexibility
at the margin”, in Regini, M. and G. Esping-Andersen (eds.), De-regulation and Unem-
ployment: the European Experience, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 307-335.
[15] Messina, J. and G. Valanti (2007): “Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions: Evidence
from Europe”, T h eE c o n o m i cJ o u r n a l , vol. 117, 521, pp. 279-301.
[16] Meyer, B. D. (1990): “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells”, Econometrica,
vol. 58, 4, pp. 757-782.
[17] Mortensen, D.T and C.A. Pissarides (1994): “Job Creation and Job Destruction in the
Theory of Unemployment”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 61, pp. 397-415.
[18] Mortensen, D.T. and C.A. Pissarides (1999) :“New Developments in Models of Search in
the Labor Market”, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook in Labor Economics,
Amsterdam: North Holland.
[19] Mortensen, D.T. and E. Nagypal (2007): “More on unemployment and vacancy ﬂuctua-
tions”, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 10, 3, pp. 327-347.
[20] Nagypal, E. (2004): “Worker Reallocation over the Business Cycle: The Importance of
Job-to-Job Transitions”, mimeo.
[21] OECD (2002): “Taking the measure of temporary employment”, OECD Employment Out-
look 2002, Paris, pp. 127-185.
[22] OECD (2004): “Employment Protection Regulation and Labour Market Performance”,
OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Paris, pp. 61-123.
[23] OECD (2006): “Employment and Labour Market Statistics”, vol. 2006, release 01.
[24] Osuna, V. (2005): “The Eﬀects of Reducing Firing Costs in Spain: A Lost Opportunity?”,
Contributions to Macroeconomics,v o l .5 ,1 ,A r t i c l e5 .
[25] Shimer, R. (2005): “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies”,
American Economic Review, vol. 95, 1, pp. 25-49.
[26] Silva, J.I. and M. Toledo (2007): “Labor Turnover Costs and the Cyclical Behavior of
Vacancies and Unemployment”, mimeo.
[27] Thomas, C. (2006): “Firing costs, labor market search and the business cycle”, mimeo.
22[28] Veracierto, M. (2007): “Firing costs and business cycle ﬂuctuations”, International Eco-
nomic Review, forthcoming.
[29] Wasmer, E. (1999): “Competition for jobs in a growing economy and the emergence of
dualism in employment”, The Economic Journal, vol. 109, 457, pp. 349— 371.
[30] Zanetti, F. (2007): “Labor market institutions and aggregate ﬂuctuations in a search and
matching model”, mimeo.
23